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Criminal Procedure-North Carolina's Capital Sentencing
Procedure: The Struggle for an Acceptable Jury
Instruction
No right is valued more highly than the right to life, and certainly no
right should be more closely guarded and jealously protected by our judicial
system. Capital punishment stands apart from other forms of criminal punish-
ment because it deprives the defendant of this precious right to life and be-
cause this deprivation is final and irrevocable. As the United States Supreme
Court said, "Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two."1 Consequently,
any proceeding that concludes with the imposition of the death penalty must
be scrutinized carefully. As an influential and important step in such a pro-
ceeding, the instruction of the sentencing authority2 must reflect the court's
commitment to protecting the defendant's right to life.
In the last year and a half the North Carolina Supreme Court has decided
several cases determining the appropriate jury instruction in capital sentencing
cases under North Carolina's capital sentencing statute, 15A-2000. 3 In State v.
Pinch4 and the cases following it5 the court approved an instruction to the jury
that it has a duty to recommend a sentence of death if it found: (1) that one or
more statutory aggravating circumstances existed; (2) that the aggravating cir-
1. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
2. In North Carolina the sentencing authority is the trial jury. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(a)(2) (1983).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a) (1983) provides for a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Section (b)
provides that in this proceeding the trial judge must instruct the jury to consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances:
(b) Sentence Recommendation by the Jury.-Instructions determined by the trial judge
to be warranted by the evidence shall be given by the court in its charge to the jury prior
to its deliberation in determining sentence. In all cases in which the death penalty may
be authorized the judge shall include in his instructions to the jury that it must consider
any aggravating circumstance or circumstances or mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances from the lists provided in subsections (e) and (f) which may be supported by the
evidence, and shall furnish to the jury a written list of issues relating to such aggravating
or mitigating circumstance or circumstances.
After hearing the evidence, argument of counsel, and instructions of the court, the
jury shall deliberate and render a sentence recommendation to the court, based upon the
following matters:
(1) Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances as enumer-
ated in subsection (e) exist;
(2) Whether any sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances as enumerated
in subsection (f), which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found,
exist; and
(3) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or to imprisonment in the State's prison for life.
4. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982).
5. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656,
292 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 503 (1982).
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cumstances were substantial enough to warrant the death penalty; and (3) that
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances be-
yond a reasonable doubt.6 Prior to Pinch the jury usually was instructed that
on making these three findings, it "may," but "need not," recommend a sen-
tence of death.7 Consequently, the instructions approved in Pinch represented
a substantial change because they forbid the jury to exercise any discretion
after finding these three elements. Defendant in Pinch contended that these
instructions "'prejudicially withdrew from the jury the final option.., to
recommend a life sentence notwithstanding its earlier findings.' ",8 Stating that
it implicitly had answered this contention in State v. Goodman,9 the court re-
jected defendant's argument.
In his dissent in Pinch and the four cases following it,10 Justice Exum
voiced his strong opposition to the majority's conclusion that under North
Carolina's capital sentencing statute a jury must return the death penalty after
making certain findings. First, Exum pointed out that section 15A-2000 does
not provide that a jury must return the death penalty,"I but simply ensures
that certain prerequisites are met before a sentence of death may be im-
posed. 12 Second, contending that the majority's interpretation of the statute
resulted from a fear of constitutional attack, Exum argued that the majority's
construction was not constitutionally required.' 3 Third, he contended that the
majority's holding was based on a misreading of Goodman.' 4
Justice Exum's arguments justify a careful scrutiny of the majority's con-
6. State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 184, 293 S.E.2d 569, 590, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 503 (1982);
Pinch, 306 N.C. at 32-33, 292 S.E.2d at 227; State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 689-90, 292 S.E.2d
243, 263, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 707-09, 292 S.E.2d 264,
274-275, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982). The jury instructions given in State v. McDougall, 308
N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983), were slightly different in that the order of issues (2) and (3) were
reversed. Record at 119, McDougall.
The supreme court did not find prejudicial error in the McDougall instructions, but the court
did recommend a model charge, discussed infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
7. NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, NORTH CAROLINA PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES 150.10, at 4 (Replacement May 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as N.C.P.I. CRIM.].
8. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 33, 292 S.E.2d at 227. Defendant argued that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000 (1983) and the eighth and fourteenth amendments protect a defendant's right to trial by a
jury that has the option to recommend a life sentence notwithstanding its earlier findings. De-
fendant's Brief at 75.
9. 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979). In Goodman the court overruled an assignment of
error based on the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it could still recommend life impris-
onment even though it found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. The
Pinch majority quoted the following language from Goodman: "'[lI]t would be improper to in-
struct the jury that they may, as defendant suggests, disregard the procedure outlined by the legis-
lature and impose the sanction of death at their own whim.'" Pinch, 306 N.C. at 34, 292 S.E.2d at
227 (quoting Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590). Apparently, the Pinch court felt thatthis language implied that a jury should not be permitted to recommend life imprisonment if it
found the three elements set out in the procedure.
10. See supra note 5 (four cases decided after Pinch on issue of jury instructions). Justice
Exum dissented in all four cases for the same reasons that he dissented in Pinch.
11. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (Exum, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 46, 292 S.E.2d at 234 (Exum, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (Exum, J., dissenting). See infra notes 60-66 and accompany-
ing text.
14. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 45, 292 S.E.2d at 234 (Exum, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 62
CAPITAL SENTENCING
clusion. This examination is also compelled because the issue involved,
whether the jury should be instructed that it "must" or that it "may" recom-
mend death upon making certain findings, raises questions concerning the
protection of the defendant's right to life.
During the last decade the courts and the North Carolina legislature have
struggled to fashion an acceptable standard for capital sentencing instruction.
Any examination of the present controversy, therefore, must begin with the
legal history of both the capital sentencing statute and jury instructions. North
Carolina's present capital sentencing statute began with Furman v. Georgia,'5
in which the United States Supreme Court vacated the defendants' death
sentences in cases arising out of Texas and Georgia. In Furman the jury had
wide discretion in the imposition of the death penalty. This unbridled discre-
tion troubled the Court. "Central to the limited holding in Furman was the
conviction that the vesting of standardless sentencing power in the jury vio-
lated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."'16 In response to this holding,
the North Carolina legislature imposed a mandatory sentence of death for first
degree murder and first degree rape, 17 leaving the jury no idependent sen-
tencing discretion in such cases.
The North Carolina statute reached the United States Supreme Court in
Woodson v. North Carolina.18 The Supreme Court struck down the North
Carolina mandatory death penalty statute,19 and the state legislature drafted a
new statute substantially identical to the present capital sentencing statute.20
Since this statute was adopted in response to Woodson and its companion
cases, these cases offer insight into the legislative intent behind the statute.
In Woodson the Court held that North Carolina's mandatory death sen-
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Three cases were before the Supreme Court inFurman. In one case,
the death penalty was imposed for murder, and in the other two, it was imposed for rape. The
Supreme Court held that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. See generally Wollan, Death Penalty After Furman, 4 Loy. U. CHi. L.J.
339 (1974); Note, Is the Death Penalty Dead?, 26 BAYLOR L. RaV. 114 (1974); Note, Response to
Furman: Can Legislatures Breathe Life Back Into Death?, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 172 (1974).
16. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (amended 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
21 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (repealed 1979). Second degree murder was punishable by a term of im-
prisonment from two years to life, and second degree rape was punishable by life imprisonment or
a term of years determined by the court. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17, 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
18. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The defendants in Woodson, whose convictions of first-degree mur-
der and whose death sentences under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (amended
1979) were upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court, challenged the constitutionality of the
mandatory death sentence statute. Woodson was decided along with four other cases: Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976); and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the controlling opinion.
19. The Supreme Court held that North Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute vio-
lated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280.
20. The statute enacted following Woodson was 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 406, § 2 (Ist Sess.)
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983)). With the exception of three minor
amendments, it was identical to the present N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000. One 1979 amendment
added subdivision (11) to subsection (e). 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 565, § 1 (1st Sess.). Near the
middle of subdivision (5) of subsection (e), a 1979 amendment inserted "or a sex offense," 1979
N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 652, § 1 (1st Sess.), and a 1981 amendment inserted "homicide," 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws ch. 652, § 1 (lst Sess.).
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tence statute failed "to provide a constitutionally tolerable response to
Furman's rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital
sentences." 21 The Court expounded on this holding in Gregg v. Georgia,22
reading Furman as mandating "that where discretion is afforded a sentencing
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and lim-
ited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 23
With its adoption of section 15A-2000(b), the legislature provided for the di-
rection of jury discretion by requiring that the jury base its sentencing recom-
mendation on a balancing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
involved.24 Woodson also required that the sentencing authority consider "the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense."25 The North Carolina statute meets this requirement by
listing statutory aggravating and mitigating factors that focus on the defendant
and the circumstances of his crime.26
The requirements specified in Gregg and Woodson stemmed from the
Supreme Court's concern that the death penalty should be imposed only when
the jury followed standardized guidelines. The Court said in Gregg:
Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an
individual mercy violates the Constitution. Furman held only that,
in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be im-
posed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to
impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing au-
thority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime
and the defendant.27
In Woodson the plurality opinion stated that because of the qualitative differ-
ence between death and life imprisonment, "there is a corresponding differ-
ence in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case." 28 Consequently, section 15A-
2000(c) requires three findings before a jury may recommend a sentence of
death.29 These three findings are nearly identical to those that trigger the
jury's duty to recommend the death penalty in the jury instructions approved
21. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302.
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. Id. at 189.
24. See supra note 3.
25. The Woodson court reasoned:
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally
reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that
in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of
the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted).
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000(e) & (f) (1983) (listing of statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances).
27. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
28. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (1983).
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by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Pinch.30
The relevant history of the jury instructions began after the North Caro-
lina legislature's response to Woodson. Instruction 150.10 of the North Caro-
lina Pattern Jury Instructionsfor Criminal Cases31 was rewritten following the
enactment of section 15A-2000 in 1977. The June 1977 draft instructed the
jury that to recommend the death penalty, the state had to prove the three
elements set out in section 15A-2000(c): 32 (1) that one or more statutory ag-
gravating circumstances existed; (2) that they were sufficiently substantial to
call for the imposition of the death penalty; and (3) that the mitigating circum-
stances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. If the
jury unanimously made these findings it was instructed that it "may" recom-
mend the death penalty.33 In 1979 the instructions were revised slightly, so
that the jury was instructed, "you may, although you need not, recommend
that the defendant be sentenced to death."'34 Thus, from 1977 until May 1980,
when the jury instructions were changed substantially, section 15A-2000 was
construed as requiring the jury to make the three findings before it could con-
sider recommending death. During this time, neither the courts nor the legis-
lature indicated that this construction was faulty or that the jury should be
required to recommend death upon making the three findings.
In 1980 the jury instructions were revised to impose a duty to recommend
a sentence of death if a jury makes these three findings.35 The footnote to
these instructions cited State v. Goodman as the basis for the change in the
wording from "may recommend" to "duty to recommend." 36 Apparently, the
(c) Findings in Support of Sentence of Death.-When the jury recommends a sen-
tence of death, the foreman of the jury shall sign a writing on behalff the jury which
writing shall show:
(1) The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which the jury finds
beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) That the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by the jury
are sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the death penalty; and
(3) That the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.
30. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 32-33, 292 S.E.2d at 227. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The only difference between the statute and the jury instructions is in the wording of the third
issue: the statute reads "that the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggra-
vating circumstances," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-2000(c) (1983), while the instructions state "that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances." Pinch, 306 N.C. at 32-33, 292
S.E.2d at 222. Presumably, this variation in wording would not significantly affect the jury's
decision.
31. The North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions are prepared by a committee of ten trial
judges chaired by the Honorable Thomas W. Seay, Jr. This preparation is considered an ongoing
project with two functions: (1) preparation of new instructions in response to new statutes, cases,
and requests from members of the bench and bar;, and 2) revision of existing instructions in re-
sponse to changes in law or policy. N.C.P.I. CRIm., supra note 7, at preface (December 1982).
The instructions are intended to state the law applicable to a fact situation, and a trial judge is to
make adaptations if necessary. Id., at xix (Guide to the Use of This Book). The pattern jury
instructions do not indicate whether trial judges are required to use these pattern instructions.
32. See supra note 3.
33. N.C.P.I. C~iM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 5 (June 1977).
34. Id., § 150-10, at 4 (Replacement, May 1979) (emphasis added).
35. Id., § 150.10, at 3-4 (Replacement, May 1980) (emphasis added).
36. The footnote gave the case name and cite, and referred to Goodman, 298 N.C. at 34-35,
1984]
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drafters of the instructions considered certain language in the Goodman opin-
ion as mandating this change.
In Goodman the trial court had used the "may recommend" instruction,37
but defendant contended that the court had erred in failing to instruct the jury
that it could recommend life imprisonment despite a finding that the aggravat-
ing circumstances outweighed the mitigating. Defendant argued that the jury
would balance mathematically the two factors and impose death whenever the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. The supreme court re-
jected this argument because it felt that a jury would not decide such an im-
portant question so mathematically. "Nuances of character and circumstances
cannot be weighed in a precise mathematical formula. '38 More importantly,
the court feared that defendant's suggestion would lead the jury to believe that
it could disregard the statutory standards, thus jeopardizing the constitutional-
ity of the instructions:
[M]e believe that it would be improper to instruct the jury that they
may, as defendant suggests, disregard the procedure outlined by the
legislature and impose the sanction of death at their whim. To do so
would be to revert to a system pervaded by arbitrariness and caprice.
The exercise of such unbridled discretion by the jury under a court's
instruction would be contrary to the rules of Furman and the cases
which followed it.3 9
The drafters of pattern instruction 150.10 read this language as requiring a jury
to recommend death if it found the three elements set out by the legislature in
section 15A-2000(c). In State v. Pinch the North Carolina Supreme Court up-
held the 1980 change in the jury instructions, apparently unwilling to chal-
lenge the interpretation of Goodman adopted by the drafters of the pattern
instruction.
Pinch and its companion cases4° were appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Although certiorari was denied, Justice Stevens wrote a
memorandum opinion in Smith v. North Carolina,41 questioning the constitu-
tionality of the jury instructions approved by the North Carolina Supreme
257 S.E.2d at 590 (discussion of jury instructions). See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
N.C.P.I. CraM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 4 n.7 (Replacement, May 1980) (emphasis added).
37. The Goodman instructions were closest to the 1977 pattern jury instructions, since the
trial judge in Goodman told the jury that it "may recommend" death if it found the necessary
elements. Record at 185, Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569. But the trial judge switched
issues two and three, so the jury decided first whether the mitigating circumstances outweighed the
aggravating, and then whether the aggravating circumstances warranted death. Id. at 174. See
supra text accompanying notes 32-33. The order of these issues was probably insignificant, espe-
cially since the jury still had the discretion to recommend life or death after it answered all the
issues.
38. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 34-35, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
39. Id at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590 (citation omitted).
40. State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691,292 S.E.2d 264 (1982); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292
S.E.2d 243 (1982). All three cases were decided on September 4, 1982. Defendants in Smith and
Williams, like defendant in Pinch, assigned error to the trial court's jury instructions at the sen-
tencing phases. The instructions were substantially the same as those given in Pinch, and the
North Carolina Supreme Court, citing Pinch, upheld these instructions in both cases. Williams,
305 N.C. at 689-90, 292 S.E.2d at 262-63; Smith, 307 N.C. at 707-09, 292 S.E.2d at 275.
41. 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982) (mem.).
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Court in these three cases. "There is an ambiguity in these instructions that
may raise a serious question of compliance with this Court's holding inLockett
v. Ohio .... "42 Justice Stevens' reasons for disapproving of the instructions
were similar to those expressed by Justice Exum in his dissent in Pinch. Both
Justices believed a jury might answer issues two and three affirmatively, find-
ing that the aggravating circumstances warranted death and that they out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances, and yet still feel that death was not the
proper penalty.4 3 Quoting a Utah Supreme Court case that instructed the jury
to consider the totality of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Justice
Stevens suggested that the North Carolina judiciary might "make slight
changes in the form of its instructions to avoid the ambiguity I have
identified." 44
In response to this memorandum decision, the North Carolina Supreme
Court in State v. McDougall45 suggested a change in the jury instructions, and
pattern instruction 150.10 was revised again to correspond with the sugges-
tions in McDougal.46 These new instructions, which remain valid, still pro-
42. Id at 474. Lockett held that, to meet constitutional requirements, "a death penalty stat-
ute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances." Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 610 (1978). Footnote one in Justice Stevens' opinion is a quotation from Lockett:
"There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority
should be used to impose death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital
cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that
the death penalty will be imposed in spite offactors which may callfor a less severepenaly.
When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible
with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Smith v. North Carolina, 103 S. Ct. 474,474 n.1 (1982) (mem.) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605).
43. The pertinent part of Justice Stevens' opinion is as follows:
Literally read, however, those instructions may lead the jury to believe that it is required
to make two entirely separate inquiries: First, do the aggravating circumstances, consid-
ered apart from the mitigating circumstances, warrant the imposition of the death pen-
alty? And second, do the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors? It
seems to me entirely possible that a jury might answer both of those questions affirma-
tively and yet feel that a comparison of the totality of the aggravating factors with the
totality of mitigating factors leaves it in doubt as to the proper penalty. But the death
penalty can be constitutionally imposed only if the procedure assures reliabilty in the
determination that "death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."
Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 474-75 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601).
Justice Exum said that:
Conscientious juries may determine that these issues ought to be answered affirmatively
and yet, because of circumstances of the case, "nuances," if you will, not subject to artic-
ulation in a statute or a verdict and not perhaps articulable by the jurors themselves, feel
impelled to recommend that the death penalty not be imposed.
Pinch, 306 N.C. at 45, 292 S.E.2d at 234 (Exum, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
44. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 475. Pointing out that the Utah Supreme Court "takes a less rigid
approach to this issue," Justice Stevens quoted from State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982):
"After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you
must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total
mitigation, and you must further be persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances."
Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 475 (quoting Wood, 648 P.2d at 83).
45. 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983).
46. Id at 32-34, 301 S.E.2d at 327-28. N.C.P.I. CriM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 5, 36 (Re-
placement, April 1983).
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vide that the jury has a "duty" to recommend death if it answers the three
issues affirmatively, but the order and the form of the issues are different. Is-
sues two and three are reversed, so that the jury now decides whether the miti-
gating circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating before it
decides whether the aggravating circumstances are substantial enough to call
for a recommendation of death. The final issue now reads, "Do you find...
that the aggravating. . circumstances found by you. . . are sufficiently sub-
stantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty when considered with the
mitigating... circumstances found by you?" 47 Emphasizing this revision, the
new instuctions recommend that this final issue be accompanied by careful
instructions that the jury should consider all the circumstances before making
its decision. Although the jury still has a duty to recommend the death pen-
alty if it answers this final issue affirmatively, it may not respond to this issue
until it has compared the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the
totality of the mitigating circumstances.48 These new instructions satisfy Jus-
47. McDougall, 308 N.C. at 33, 301 S.E.2d at 327 (emphasis added). The complete instruc-
tions contain four issues, the second being whether the jury finds any mitigating circumstances.
This second issue is omitted in this discussion for the sake of convenience. Consequently, the
third and fourth issues of the complete instructions are the second and third issues for the pur-
poses of this discussion.
The order and form of the issues to be submitted to the jury should be substantially
as follows:
(1) Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or
more of the following aggravating circumstances?
(2) Do you find from the evidence the existence of one or more of the following mitigat-
ing circumstances?
(3) Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances you have found is, or are, insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circum-
stance or circumstances you have found?
(4) Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance or circum-
stances found by you is, or are, sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of
the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances found by you?
McDougall, 308 N.C. at 32-33, 301 S.E.2d at 327.
The issues set out in pattern instruction 150.10 are virtually identical to those in McDougall.
N.C.P.I. CRIM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 4-5 (Replacement, April 1983).
48. The instructions that should accompany the final issues are as follows:
"In deciding this issue, you are not to consider the aggravating circumstances stand-
ing alone. You must consider them in connection with any mitigating circumstances
found by you. After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the
death penalty is justified and appropriate in this case before you can answer the issue
'yes.' In so doing, you are not applying a mathematical formula. For example, three
circumstances of one kind do not automatically and of necessity outweigh one circum-
stance of another kind. The number of circumstances found is only one consideration in
determining which circumstances outweigh others. The jury may very properly empha-
size one circumstances more than another in a particular case. You must consider the
relative substantiality and persuasiveness of the existing aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances in making this determination. You, the jury, must determine how compel-
ling and persuasive the totality of the aggravating circumstances are when compared
with the totality of the mitigating circumstances found by you. After so doing, if you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances found by you are
sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty, it would be your duty to answer the
issue 'yes.' If you are not so satisfied or have a reasonable doubt, it would be your duty
to answer the issue 'no."'
[Vol. 62
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tice Stevens' criticism since the jury considers the totality of the circumstances
before it has a duty to recommend death. Justice Stevens' criticism could have
also been satisfied by simply reverting to the pre-1980 instructions, which had
provided that the jury may, "on further deliberation," recommend death if it
answered the three issues affirmatively.4 9 These "further deliberations" had
allowed the jury to consider all circumstances before making a decision.
Although the new instructions substantially improve the 1980 instructions
approved in Pinch, the North Carolina Supreme Court has refused to find
reversible error in these older instructions. In State v. Kirkley 5° the trial court
had given the jury the older instructions, asking first whether the jury found
the aggravating circumstances substantial enough to impose the death penalty,
and then whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating.51
The court told the jury it had a duty to recommend death if it answered these
issues affirmatively. On appeal, the supreme court set out the correct form and
order for the issues, but did not find reversible error in the trial court's instruc-
tion. "Although the jury instructions given during the sentencing procedure
were not a model charge, they were free from prejudicial error."52 Conse-
quently, and despite Justice Stevens' frank criticism, the faulty instructions
approved in Pinch still plague North Carolina's judicial system.
Thus, the history of North Carolina's capital sentencing instruction
reveals that several changes and much ambiguity could have been avoided
had the instructions remained as they were in 1979, providing that the jury
may recommend death upon making the three findings.53 This observation
naturally raises the question why the drafters of pattern instruction 150.10 and
the North Carolina Supreme Court felt that the instructions should be
changed to provide that the jury must recommend death. Both sources cite
Goodman as the basis for this change.54 Perhaps Goodman reminded the
drafters and the supreme court that they should examine the constitutionality
of the jury instructions. In his dissent in Pinch, Justice Exum stated, "The
majority construes the statute in this way [in the jury instruction] on the sole
ground that otherwise the statute would be subject to the constitutional attack
that a jury could decide between life and death in its unbridled discretion."55
McDougall, 308 N.C. at 34, 301 S.E.2d at 327-28 (citations omitted).
Pattern instruction 150.10 is identical. N.C.P.I. CriM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 36-37 (Re-
placement, April 1983).
49. The jury was instructed that "if, having answered [the three issues] 'yes,' you are, on
further deliberation, satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only just punishment for the
defendant is the death penalty, then you may unanimously so recommend." N.C.P.I. CRiM., supra
note 7, § 150.10, at 4 (Replacement, May 1979) (emphasis added).
50. 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983).
51. Id at 216-17, 302 S.E.2d at 155-56.
52. Id at 217, 302 S.E.2d at 156. There are problems with the supreme court's refusal to find
reversible error in these older instructions. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
53. N.C.P.I. CriM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 4 (Replacement, May 1979).
54. Goodman did not require this change in the instructions. See supra notes 37-39 and ac-
companying text.
55. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (Exum, J., dissenting). In Furman the United
States Supreme Court held that a statute allowing the jury unbridled discretion to sentence a
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Although the majority never specified that this was the reason for its interpre-
tation, it is the only reasonable explanation. The majority did quote Good-
man, saying that it would be improper to allow the jury to disregard the
statutory procedure and "'impose death at its whim . . . . The exercise of
such unbridled discretion by the jury under the court's instruction would be
contrary to the rules of Furman and the cases which have followed it.' -56
This language suggests that the majority in Pinch was concerned with the con-
stitutionality of the jury's discretion. But the majority's interpretation, that the
jury must be required to recommend death if it makes certain findings, is not
constitutionally required, as Justice Exum explained in his dissent.57
In Goodman the court stated that it would be unconstitutional to instruct
the jury that it could disregard the statutory guidelines and impose death at its
own discretion.58 The United States Supreme Court would most likely agree
with this statment, since "Furman held. . . that. . . the decision to impose
[death] had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would
focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendent." 59
But neither Furman nor Gregg and its companion cases suggest that the death
penalty must be imposed when the jury makes certain findings within these
standards. As Justice Exum pointed out in his dissent,60 the Supreme Court in
Gregg rejected defendant's argument that the proceeding under which he was
convicted was faulty because certain discretionary decisions resulted in some
qualified defendants escaping the death penalty.61
[These decisions are ones] which may remove a defendant from con-
sideration as a candidate for the death penalty. Furman, in contrast,
dealt with the decision to impose the death penalty on a specified
individual. . . .Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the deci-
sion to afford an individual mercy violates the Constitution. Furman
held. . . that. . . the decision to impose [death] has to be guided by
standards .... 62
The Supreme Court wanted to ensure that certain standards guide the decision
to impose death. "The jury is not required to find any mitigating circum-
stances in order to make a recommendation of mercy. . . but it must find a
defendant to death was unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S 238 (1972).
56. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 34, 292 S.E.2d at 227 (quoting Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at
590).
57. Id at 45-49, 292 S.E.2d at 234-36 (Exum, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976)). See infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
58. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
59. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
60. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 47, 292 S.E.2d at 235 (Exum, J., dissenting).
61. Defendant argued that the arbitrariness condemned by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1982), continued to exist in the new sentencing procedures that Georgia had adopted in response
to Furman. He pointed out the discretion inherent in processing a murder case: the state prosecu-
tor chooses whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital offense; the jury may convict a defendant
charged with a capital offense with a lesser included offense; and a defendant sentenced to die may
have his sentence commuted by the governor. These factors may cause qualified defendants to
escape the death penalty. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198-99.
62. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
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statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence of
death."'63 It was this same concern that the North Carolina Supreme Court
voiced in Goodman when it refused an instruction that it feared would allow
the jury to "impose death at its whim." 64 The drafters of pattern instruction
150.10 and the North Carolina Supreme Court in Pinch misconstrued this con-
cern, by requiring that jury discretion be strictly limited not only in a decision
to impose death, but also in a decision to grant ife by imposing a sentence of
life imprisonment. Goodman and the United States Supreme Court cases do
not suggest that discretion must be so limited when the jury wishes to impose a
life sentence rather than death.65 They fail to suggest that this is even the
preferred view. 66
If the instructions that a jury must recommend death upon answering the
three issues affirmatively are not constitutionally required, the next question is
whether they are constitutional at all. 6 7 Justice Stevens in his memorandum
opinion denying certiorari for Pinch raised questions about their constitution-
ality under Lockett v. Ohio.68 Justice Stevens did not hold that the instruc-
tions are unconstitutional, but he did state that "the question whether the
instructions to the juries are consistent with Lockett remains open for consid-
63. Id at 197.
64. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590 (emphasis added).
65. As the United State Supreme Court pointed out in Woodson, "Because of [the] qualita-
tive difference [between death and life imprisonment], there is a corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). the Supreme Court
stated, "we are satisfied that this qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for
a greater degree of reliability when the sentence is imposed." Id. at 604.
66. In Gregg the Court specifically rejected defendant's argument that "the requirements of
Furman are not met.. . because the jury has the power to decline to impose the death penalty
even if it finds one or more statutory aggravating circumstances." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203. The
Court pointed out that the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed every death sentence to assure that
it was proportional to other sentences for similar crimes. Id at. 203. The North Carolina statute
provides for a similar review of every death sentence by the North Carolina Supreme Court. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (1983). This review further confirms that the North Carolina
construction requiring the jury to recommend death upon making certain findings is not constitu-
tionally required:
Since the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the
decision to inflict the [death] penalty, the isolated decision of the jury to gford mercy does
not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced
under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added).
According to Gregg, then, the instruction that the jury must recommend death upon answer-
ing the three issues affirmatively is not constitutionally required, and an instruction that the jury
may recommend death would pass constitutional muster.
67. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Pinch agree that the instructions approved
in Pinch would pass constitutional muster under the rationale of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976). Pinch, 306 N.C. at 34 n.17, 292 S.E.2d at 227 n.17; id at 48, 292 S.E.2d at 236 (Exum, J.,
dissenting). In Jurek the United States Supreme Court examined a Texas statute requiring the
jury to recommend death if it answered three questions affirmatively. The Court held that the
death penalty was not mandatory, and thus subject to constitutional attack, since the Texas proce-
dure allowed for consideration of the mitigating factors. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272. Because the
North Carolina instructions approved in Pinch also allow for consideration of mitigating factors,
they are arguably constitutional under the rationale of Jurek.
68. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See supra notes 42-43.
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eration in collateral proceedings."' 69 The current North Carolina jury instruc-
tions, revised to correct problems that Justice Stevens raised,70 almost
certainly would be held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court.71
But since the North Carolina Supreme Court has refused to find reversible
error in the Pinch instructions, 72 the constitutionality of these instructions is
still undetermined. As it stands today, a trial judge, apparently at his whim,
may decide whether to use the new instructions set out in McDougall, or the
older instructions approved in Pinch. Consequently, not all defendants in cap-
ital cases may be sentenced under the same instructions. Defendants sen-
tenced under the older instructions may be condemned to death by a jury that
has never been given the opportunity to consider the totality of the circum-
stances involved in the case.73 Juries may feel compelled to sentence such
defendants to death, despite doubting that such a sentence is appropriate.
These instructions do not ensure that death is an appropriate punishment, as
Lockett requires.74 Thus, while the constitutional rights of defendants sen-
tenced under the new instructions may be protected adequately, the constitu-
tional rights of those sentenced under the older instructions may not be.
Since North Carolina's capital sentencing jury instructions are largely the
result of responses to constitutional issues raised in Furman and Gregg and its
companion cases, it is instructive to examine how other states have responded
to these issues. A few state legislatures have drafted statutes requiring the
sentencing authority to impose the death penalty if it makes certain findings. 75
Most state legislatures, however, have not imposed such a requirement. Like
North Carolina General Statutes section 15A-2000(c), 76 the capital sentencing
statutes in most states merely ensure that the death penalty cannot be imposed
unless certain findings are made. The courts in these states have not construed
their statutes as the North Carolina Supreme Court has, to require the jury to
impose the death penalty if the statutory findings are made.
For example, in Burrows v. State77 the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled
69. Smith v. North Carolina, 103 S. Ct. 474, 475 (1982) (mem.).
70. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
71. The instructions accompanying the fourth issue of the current instructions, see supra note
48, are substantially identical to those suggested by Justice Stevens in his memorandum decision.
See supra note 44. These instructions require that the jury consider all of the circumstances before
responding to issue four, thus eliminating the possibility that death will be imposed despite the
jury's doubt that it is proper. This possibility led Justice Stevens to question the constitutionality
of the earlier instructions. See supra note 43.
72. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
75. The Texas statute requires a recommendation of death if certain findings are made. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text. The California and Montana statutes require the sentenc-
ing authority to impose a sentence of death if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigat-
ing, or if aggravating circumstances are found and the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to
call for leniency. See infra note 89. The North Carolina jury instructions approved in Pinch are
similar to these statutes except they additionally require the jury to find that the aggravating cir-
cumstances are sufficient to warrant death before it has a duty to recommend death. See supra
text accompanying note 6.
76. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
77. 640 P.2d 533 (Okla. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1250 (1983). The pertinent part of the
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on an issue similar to that raised in Goodman. 78 The Burrows jury was in-
structed first, that it could not impose death unless it found aggravating cir-
cumstances; second, that if it found aggravating circumstances it may consider
imposing the death penalty; and third, that it could not impose the death pen-
alty if it found that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating.
Defendant contended that the trial court should have added a fourth instruc-
tion stating that the jury could decline to impose the death penalty even if it
found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating.79 Ruling
as the North Carolina Supreme Court did in Goodman,80 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court did not find this fourth instruction necessary. But the
Oklahoma court specifically pointed out that this ruling did not mean that the
jury was required to impose the death penalty if it found that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating. "The fourth instruction was sub-
sumed in the second, since the jurors were told that they could, not that they
had to, impose the death sentence."81
The Missouri Supreme Court has declared explicitly that the jury is not
required to impose the death penalty if it makes the findings that the Missouri
statute requires for consideration of a sentence of death.82 In State v. Bolder
83
the Missouri court stated: 'The jury cannot impose death if it finds that the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, but that
situtation is the only one in which punishment is mandated. Under no cir-
cumstances is the jury obliged to impose death." 84 The court also approved
instructions explicitly telling the jury that it was not compelled to impose
death if it found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigat-
ing.85 These examples and others86 demonstrate that other jurisdictions have
Oklahoma capital sentencing statute provides, "[u]nless at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in this act is so found or if it is found that any such aggravating circum-
stance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty
shall not be imposed." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1982).
78. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
79. Burrows, 640 P.2d at 544.
80. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 34-35, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
81. Burrows, 640 P.2d at 544.
82. The pertinent part of the Missouri capital sentencing statute provides:
1. [T]he judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it
to consider:.
(4) Whether a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist to warrant the
imposition of death or whether a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances ex-
ist which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found to exist.
(5) Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
section is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983).
83. 635 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 770 (1983).
84. Id at 683.
85. Id
86. The Louisiana capital punishment statute provides: "A sentence of death shall not be
imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance exists and, after consideration of any mitigating circumstances, recommends that the
sentence of death be imposed." LA. CODE Cram. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
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not believed it constitutionally necessary to limit the jury's discretion when it
wishes to grant mercy, as North Carolina has done.
There seems, then, to be no compelling basis for the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision to construe section 15A-2000 as requiring the jury to
impose the death penalty if it answers the issues in subsection (c) affirmatively.
There is no indication in section 15A-2000, or in the Gregg v. Georgia or
Woodson v. North Carolina opinions, which prompted the statute,87 that the
North Carolina legislature intended this construction. Subsection (c) was writ-
ten in response to the United States Supreme Court's demand that the imposi-
tion of death, or the denial of the defendant's right to life, be reliably justified.
The three findings were meant to be a threshold, at which point the jury could
consider imposing death.8 8 Nowhere in Gregg or Woodson did the Supreme
Court suggest that a sentence of life imprisonment should not always be an
option, and nothing in the North Carolina statute suggests that the three find-
ings in subsection (c) should trigger a duty to recommend death. The United
States Supreme Court never implied, and the North Carolina legislature never
intended, that the jury should ever be required to recommend a sentence of
death. If the North Carolina legislature had intended that the statute be con-
strued to require the jury to recommend death upon making the findings in
subsection (c), it could have indicated this intention clearly in the statute, as
legislatures in other states have done.89 The legislature's intent is further con-
The Louisiana Supreme Court has found reversible error in instructions that the jury must recom-
mend death ifit finds one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Brogdon, 426 So. 2d 158 (La. 1983).
In Mississippi the capital sentencing statute provides that the jury may impose the death
penalty only after finding that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist, and finding insufficient
mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Cum.
Supp. 1983). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "[if the state merely proves the exist-
ence of an aggravating circumstance, the jury is free to find it insufficient to warrant death and is
not required to automatically impose the death penalty." Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640, 646
(Miss. 1979).
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits hold that jury instructions that fail to inform the jury of its
option to recommend a life sentence despite a finding that aggravating circumstances exist violate
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 801-02 (1 1th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1798 (1983); Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 3495 (1982). The Georgia and the South Carolina Supreme Courts find revers-
ible error when instructions fail to inform the jury that it may grant mercy despite proof of aggra-
vating circumstances. See, e.g., Spivey v. Smith, 241 Ga. 477, 481, 246 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1978);
State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 585, 300 S.E.2d 63, 71 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1802 (1983).
The Virginia Supreme Court has said:
Code § 19.2-264.4C provides that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless the
Commonwealth proves one of the two aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. The statute does not require that, upon such proof, the jury must impose the
extreme penalty but only that, absent such proof, it shall not do so.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 479, 248 S.E.2d 135, 150 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967
(1979).
87. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
88. This is how the court construed subsection (c) before Pinch. The jury instructions read
that, upon making the three findings, the jury may, though it need not, recommend death.
N.C.P.I. CRiM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 4 (Replacement, May 1979).
89. The capital sentencing statutes in both California and Montana provide that a sentence
of death shall be imposed if the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating, or are
not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The California statute provides that "the trier of
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firmed by ModelPenal Code section 210.6, on which the legislature drew heav-
ily in drafting the North Carolina statute.90 This section provides that the
death sentence shall not be imposed unless the sentencing authority finds that
an aggravating circumstance exists and that no mitigating circumstance is suf-
ficiently substantial to call for leniency.9 1 The Model Code does not suggest
anywhere that the death sentence must be imposed upon these findings.
Although there is no basis for the North Carolina Supreme Court's con-
struction of section 15A-2000, the most important question is not why the
Court construes the statute as it does, but, rather, what implications this con-
struction has for a defendant convicted of a capital felony. Does this construc-
tion affect the outcome of the sentencing phase of the trial, and, more
importantly, does it adequately protect a defendant's right to life?
The North Carolina capital sentencing statute is unique in the findings it
requires before the jury can recommend death. Most capital sentencing stat-
utes require only a showing that the aggravating circumstances exist or that
they are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating circumstances.92 But the North
Carolina statute is more lenient toward the defendant in this respect, permit-
ting the jury to impose the death sentence only if it concludes that aggravating
circumstances exist which outweigh the mitigating and that the aggravating
circumstances are sufficiently substantial to warrant death. 93 Consequently,
even under the North Carolina Supreme Court's statutory construction, the
jury is not required to impose the death penalty if it finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating. The jury is always free to grant mercy
through a finding that the aggravating circumstances are not sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant death. Nevertheless, even if a North Carolina jury finds
that the aggravating circumstances do not warrant death, the instruction im-
fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). The Montana statute provides that the court "shall
impose a sentence of death if it finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances and finds that
there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-305 (1981) (emphasis added).
90. For a discussion of the legislature's reliance on the Model Penal Code, see State v. John-
son, 298 N.C. 47, 60-63, 257 S.E.2d 597, 608-10 (1979). The drafting of the Model Penal Code of
the American Law Institute began in 1952 with a grant from the Rockefeller foundation. The
Proposed Official Draft was completed in 1962. As of 1980,34 states had drawn upon this draft in
the codification or revision of their substantive criminal law. MODEL PENAL CODE forward (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962). Most states have adopted death penalty statutes that draw upon or
resemble MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 note on impact of Model
Code (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
92. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983); LA. CODE CRIM PRO. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1983): Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (CuM. Supp. 1983). The Georgia statutue provides that "unless at least
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (b) of this Code section
is found, the death penalty shall not be imposed." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1981). In South
Carolina a jury recommending death "shall designate in writing. . . the aggravating circum-
stance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20(C)(b)(9) (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1983).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(2) (1983).
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posing a duty on the jury to recommend death if it answers certain issues af-
firmatively may still affect jury deliberations and even the outcome of the
sentencing phase of the trial. The extent to which the deliberations are affected
depends on whether the issues are those approved in Pinch,94 or those set out
in McDougall, which followed Justice Stevens' memorandum decision.9"
The instructions approved in Pinch required the jury to determine first
whether the aggravating circumstances warranted death, and then whether the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. If the jury answered
both of these questions affirmatively, it was required to recommend death. It
is possible, however, that a jury could answer both questions affirmatively and
still feel that death was not warranted. The jury considers the aggravating
circumstances by themselves, and then, separately, whether the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating. After these considerations a sentence
of death or life imprisonment is required. The jury has no discretion to con-
sider the totality of the case before deciding whether death is warranted. The
case may arise when the jury feels that although the mitigating circumstances
do not outweigh the aggravating, they are still substantial enough to warrant a
grant of mercy.96 In fact, as Justice Exum pointed out in his dissent in
Pinch,97 juries in two different cases have answered all the issues affirmatively
and yet, in apparent disregard of the requirement in the instructions, have
recommended life imprisonment.98 These two cases illustrate the effect ofjury
instructions on a jury's sentencing decision. It is entirely possible that a jury
could feel as the juries in these two cases did, and yet, because of the "duty"
imposed by the instructions, not feel that it had an option to recommend life.
Whether jury instructions that conceivably could lead to such a result ad-
equately protect the defendant's right to life is questionable. And, as Justice
Stevens pointed out in his memorandum decision, the constitutionality of such
instructions is also questionable. Lockett requires that the sentencing proce-
dure ensure the reliability of a determination that death is appropriate.99 Be-
cause a jury, after considering the statutory issues, may feel forced to impose
death despite its desire to bestow mercy, it is questionable whether this relia-
bility is ensured.
The revised instructions set out in McDougall still impose a duty on the
jury to recommend death if it answers the issues affirmatively. Because of the
revised order and form of the issues, however, these instructions allow the jury
94. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
96. The Nebraska legislature even anticipated such a case by providing that the capital sen-
tencing authority must consider whether the mitigating circumstances "approach or exceed the
weight given to the aggravating circumstances." NEn. Rav. STAT. § 29-2522(2) (1979) (emphasis
added).
97. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 45 n.4, 292 S.E.2d at 234 n.4 (Exum, J., dissenting).
98. See State v. King, 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E.2d 98 (1980); State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 259
S.E.2d 502 (1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court later noted that, "[w]hile this was error, it
was error favorable to the defendant from which the State could not appeal." State v. Williams,
305 N.C. 656, 689, 292 S.E.2d 243, 263 (1982).
99. Lockett, 103 S. Ct. at 475.
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more discretion to consider the totality of the case before a recommendation is
required. The final issue that the jury is to consider is whether the aggravating
circumstances, when considered with the mitigating circumstances, are suffi-
ciently substantial to call for death.10° This issue is to be accompanied by
careful instructions which, if properly given, instruct the jury to consider all
the circumstances, aggravating and mitigating, and then decide whether the
death penalty is justified.10 '
These revised instructions dispense with the constitutional problems that
plague the Pinch instructions. Since the jury considers the totality of the cir-
cumstances involved in the case, and then decides whether death is appropri-
ate, the Lockett reliability test presumably is satisfied.' 0 2 The new instructions
also better protect the defendant's right to life since they allow the jury more
discretion to grant mercy if it so desires. Presumably, a jury could not con-
sider all the circumstances and decide death was warranted, thus answering
the final issue affirmatively, and then still feel that it should return a sentence
of life. The final issue considered by the jury provides for a consideration of
all circumstances and gives the jury the ultimate discretion to impose the death
penalty. In effect, then, these new instructions may be viewed as similar to the
pre-Goodman instructions providing that the jury may return a sentence of
death upon answering the issues affirmatively. 10 3 Both sets of instructions al-
low the jury consideration of all circumstances"° 4 and, at some point, ultimate
discretion to return or refuse to return a sentence of death.10 5 Perhaps these
new instructions reflect an attempt by the North Carolina Supreme Court and
the drafters of pattern instruction 150.10 to return to the jury the discretion to
grant mercy allowed in the pre-Goodman instructions, but denied in the in-
structions approved in Pinch.
If these new instructions are a substantial improvement over those ap-
proved in Pinch, and if they are an attempt to return to the jury more discre-
tion to grant mercy, why did Justice Exum dissent in McDougall,106 in which
the new instructions were used? There are several possible explanations. Jus-
tice Exum finds it bothersome that the jury should ever have a duty to impose
the death penalty, no matter how it responds to the issues.10 7 Arguably, the
word "duty" may have slight psychological effects on some jurors. But since
the final issue allows the jury consideration of all circumstances plus the ulti-
100. See supra note 47.
101. See supra note 48. "After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death
penalty is justified and appropriate in this case before you can answer the issue 'yes."'
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
105. The new instructions allow this discretion in the jury's consideration of the final issue,
while the pre-Goodman instructions allowed this discretion after the issues had been answered, by
instructing the jury that it may, not must, recommend death.
106. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 45, 301 S.E.2d 308, 334 (1983) (Exum, J., dissenting).
107. "I continue to think that a jury never has a duty to reccommend death no matter how it
answers the issues. It may not recommend death unless it answers the issues in a certain way."
Id.
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mate discretion to decide between life and death, imposing a duty on the jury
to recommend death if it answers this final issue affirmatively is practically
irrelevant. No alert jury could answer this issue affirmatively and still wish to
recommend a grant of mercy.
Justice Exum may also have maintained his dissent because he saw no
justifiable basis for the original change in the jury instructions, from "may
recommend" to "duty to recommend." Exum's dissent in Pinch concentrated
mainly on demonstrating that neither the statute, the Goodman holding, nor
the United States Supreme Court cases had required this change.108 Perhaps
because there was no justifiable basis for this change, Justice Exum probably
will not be satisfied until the North Carolina Supreme Court returns to the
pre-Goodman instructions.
Another possible explanation for Exum's continuing dissent is the refusal
of the North Carolina Supreme Court to find reversible error in the pre-Mc-
Dougall instructions.'0 9 In State v. Kirkley the supreme court did not find
reversible error in these older instructions, although the court admitted they
were not a "model charge."' "0 Exum maintained his dissent in Kirkley, "for
the same reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in McDougall.""' Even in
McDougall, in which the new instructions were stated, the supreme court re-
fused to find prejudicial error in the trial court's use of the Pinch instructions.
For this reason, Justice Exum's continuing dissent is entirely justified. As long
as these older instructions plague the North Carolina judicial system, the
state's protection of the defendant's right to life is questionable. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has criticized juries that have granted mercy in spite
of their duty to recommend death under the older instructions.' 12 Such criti-
cism hardly protects the defendant's right to life. It even discourages the jury's
attempt to provide such protection. As long as a defendant may be sentenced
under the older instructions, the North Carolina judicial system will risk con-
demning men and women to death without adequately protecting their right to
live.
With the new jury instructions set out in McDougall, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has returned to the jury a great deal of discretion to grant
mercy. These instructions ensure that a defendant will not be condemned to
death unless the jury is certain that such a severe penalty is justified. With such
assurance, the instructions adequately protect the defendant's right to life. But
a defendant convicted of a capital crime cannot be certain that he will be sen-
tenced under these new instructions. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
refused to find reversible error in the constitutionally suspect older instruc-
tions. Under these instructions, a defendant may be comdemned to death
even when the jury doubts that this extreme penalty is justified. Thus, a de-
108. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 38-49, 292 S.E.2d at 230-36 (Exum, J., dissenting).
109. N.C.P.I. CRIM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 3-4 (Replacement, May 1980).
110. State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 217, 302 S.E.2d 144, 156 (1983).
111. Id. at 231, 302 S.E.2d at 164 (Exum, J., dissenting).
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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fendant sentenced to death under the older instructions has no guarantee that
the jury was certain that death was the appropriate penalty. Until these older
instructions are swept from the North Carolina judicial system, a defendant
convicted of a capital crime may find his right to life unjustly threatened.
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